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Wrongful Life
by Jeffrey Thompson
The tort of "wrongful life" is frequently confused with the more established tort of "wrongful birth." A
wrongful life action is different from
a wrongful birth action in that "wrongful life" denotes a cause of action
brought by the infant himself on allegations that his very existence is
wrongful, and that "but for" the negligence of the defendant he would not
exist; "wrongful birth" claims are
brought by parents who claim that
they would have avoided conception
or terminated the pregnancy had they
been properly advised of the risk of
birth defects to the potential child. In
a "wrongful life" action the wrong
sought to be vindicated is the birth itself and not birth under one set of
circumstances as opposed to another.
Am. Jur. 2d New Topic Serv., Right to
Die; Wrongful Life §63 (1980).
The term "wrongful life" first appeared in two cases involving illegitimate infant plaintiffs. Zepeda v. Zepeda,
41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963); Williams
v. State, 18 N.Y. 1 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d

885 (1966). In both cases, the claims
were rejected because the courts
found that the plaintiff had not suffered a legally compensable wrong.
The string of wrongful life cases
which have a bearing on the case at
bar concern children born with severe
birth defects.
An important case in this field is
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227
A.2d 689 (1976) (child born with
severely impaired sight, speech, hearing and mental ability as a result of
the rubella his mother contracted
early in pregnancy). Although decided
before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), Gleitman has become the mainstay of the argument against wrongful life actions. The Court denied recovery upon the grounds of inability to
measure damages and public policy:
"The infant plaintiff would have
us measure the difference between his life with defects against
the utter void of non-existence,

but it is impossible to make such
a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of impairments against the non-existence
of life itself. By asserting that he
should not have been born, the
infant plaintiff makes it logically
impossible for a court to measure
his alleged damages because of
the impossibility of making the
comparison required by compensatory remedies."
49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 693.
In 1980 California departed from
unanimous contrary precedent and
became the first jurisdiction to allow
recovery under a wrongful life claim.
Gurlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106
Cal.Apl.3d 811, 165 Cal.Rptr. 477
(1980), hearing denied, Civ. No. 58192
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 1980). In Curlender, the infant's parents hired the
defendant laboratory to administer
tests to determine whether they were
carriers of Tay-Sachs Disease. The
tests were negligently performed, producing incorrect information on the
Curlenders' status as carriers; subsequently the plaintiff was born with
Tay-Sachs Disease. The California
Court of Appeals for the Second District ignored the arguments of Gleitman and its progeny to find for the
infant, reasoning that technological
advances and the decision in Roe v.
Wade had profoundly changed the
way in which "wrongful life" should
be viewed. The court refused to compare existence with non-existence,
but focused instead upon the fact that
"[t]he reality of the 'wrongful life'
concept is that the plaintiff both exists
and suffers, due to the negligence of
others." 106 Cal.App.3d at 289, 165
Cal.Rptr. at 488 (emphasis on original). Thus, it was argued that damages could be awarded upon the basis
of ordinary tort principles for the pain
and suffering to be endured.
Although thought by some to be
the precedent needed to pave the way
for general recognition of the "wrongful life" tort, any speculation raised by
Curlendermay have been premature in
light of the recent decision in Turpin v.
Sortini, 119 Cal.App.3d 690, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1981). In Turpin, the plain-

tiff, Joy Turpin, was born deaf after
Adam Sortini, the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a
hereditary hearing defect in Turpins
older sister.1 Joy's parents contended
that, had they known of the defect,
the plaintiff never would have been
conceived. Following Curlander'slead a
claim was made against the physician
in Joy's name alleging that, as a result
of Sortini's negligence Joy Turpin had
been deprived of the fundamental
right of a child to be born as a whole,
functional human being without total
deafness.
The lower court sustained the defendant Sortini's demurrer and the
California Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning that Curlender should be
rejected as ". . .unsound under established principles of law and.. .a Sortie
into the areas of public policy clearly
within the competence of the legislature." 119 Cal. App. 3d at -,
174
Cal.Rptr. at 129. Turpin attacks the
Curlender decision on three grounds:
inability to measure damages, considerations of public policy and the
dangers of opening up enormous new
areas of claims. The Turpin decision
points out that the normal measure
of damages in tort actions is compensatory, thereby requiring the court to
compare the plaintiff's present condition with the condition the plaintiff
would have been in if the defendant
had not been negligent. Judge Brown,
writing for the majority in Turpin,
finds Curlender's disregard of whether
or not the plaintiff would have existed
to be an avoidance of the fundamental problem of awarding damages in a
wrongful life claim. Drawing support
from Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967), and Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 408 A.2d
496 (1979), Brown retreats to the
majority opinion that the law is incapable of making a comparison bewteen life in an impaired state and
nonexistence.
In the area of public policy Turpin
can not bring itself to agree with Curlender's basic assertion that every
wrong deserves a remedy. The court
can find no support, either statutorily
or at common law, for the proposition
that a fundamental right exists to be
i
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born as a whole functional human
being. Instead it finds only problems
in developing appropriate standards
by which to determine whether a
child has been born defectively enough
to warrant recovery; a job which is
viewed as more legislative than
judicial.
No link can be found between Roe v.
Wade and an infant's right to nonexistence. Turpin prefers to return to
the persistent opinion that life, no
matter how defective, is preferable to
nonexistence. Interestingly enough,
the court makes no effort to discuss
the implications of recent decisions
concerning the right to die.
Almost as a "make-weight," the
Turpin opinion finishes with the assertion that ". . .justified concern [exists]
that the recognition of a cause of
action in these circumstances would
open up enormous new areas of
claims..." 119 Cal.App. 3d at-_, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 132. Not surprisingly,
the court finds this to be an unwelcome factor which was totally ignored
by Curlender. Having concluded thus,
Turpin attempts to move California
back into line with Gleitman and its
progeny. See Eisenbrenner v. Stanley,
106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209
(1981); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421,

404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 56
N.Y. 2d 401,413 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (1978).
The Turpin decision has created a
split of authority at the California
intermediate appellate level. Danley v.
Sup. Ct. Merced County, 64 Cal. App.
594,222 P. 362 (
); 16 Cal. Jur. 3d.
Courts §152 n.41 (1974). All eyes must
now turn to California's Supreme
Court for a resolution of this conflict.
Turpin v. Sortini, hearing granted (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 6, 1981). It will be that
court's task to either affirm the principles and ideals of Curlender or to
return to Gleitman's fold, thereby
replacing the tort of "wrongful life"
back in the realm of philosophers,
theologians and legislators.

Wrongful Birth
by Lee Eidelberg
Lawyers and law students alike
should take note of the recent emergence of a new tort. Current advancements in the field of medical science,
together with the developments in
the law sinceRoev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), are contributing to the establishment of the "wrongful birth"
action. A "wrongful birth" action is
brought by the parents of a child who
claim that they would have avoided
conception or terminated the pregnancy if they had been properly
advised of the risk of birth defects to
the potential child. Note, "Wrongful
Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 Tul.
L. Rev. 480, 484 (1980).
Several arguments have been raised
to support the contention that an
action for wrongful birth is noncompensable Defendant-physicians
often argue that they are not the
proximate cause of the injury because,
in the case of a fetal defect, they did
not cause the defect. See Smith v. United
States, 392 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ohio
1975). A physician's negligent failure
to diagnose a fetal defect, however,
may be viewed as the proximate cause
of birth of a deformed child. Gildnerv.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F.
Supp. 692 (E.D.Pa. 1978), but cf. LaPoint

v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D.Tex.
1976). An additional argument is that
the public policy consideration that
recovery for wrongful birth would
permit fraudulent claims and open
the courts to a flood of litigation.
However, this contention is substantially weakend by wrongful birth
cases recognizing the court's ability to
distinguish between meritorious and
non meritorious claims, as well as
identifying society's need for legal
redress in this area. Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Denial of recovery has also been
predicated on the theory that the
child is a blessing to the parents and
"to allow damages in a wrongful birth
suit... would mean that the physician
would have to pay for the fun.. .which
the plaintiff.. .will have in the rearing
and education of the child." Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 PaD. & C.2d 41, 43 (Lycoming County. 1957). However, there is
substantial case law to support the
contrary proposition that the birth of
a child with a deformity that could
have been detected during pregnancy,
is not a blessing. See e.g. Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967) (noting that where a
mother must spread her care, society,
and comfort over a larger group, and
where this change in family status
can be measured economically, it
should be compensable).
Furthermore, support may be drawn
from decisions such as Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1963), for
the argument that parents should be
allowed to plan the size of their families. Thus, parent plaintiffs may marshall the argument that their legal
option to abort their unborn fetus
was denied by the negligence of Appellant, and the resulting birth of
their defective child was therefore
wrongful and compensable. Gildner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F.Supp.
692 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 414 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).

